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In either case, the full statement of the problem, whether theoretical or practical, will involve
giving all the relevant information and this provides the premisses from which a conclusion
can be inferred that represents an answer to the problem. In this view, an agent’s drawing
that conclusion is an appropriate response to its asking a question, whether theoretical or
practical.
In this paper, our focus will be on practicalreasoning. Following the Aristotelian tradition,
practical reasoning is here conceived of as a belief-based, intention-motivated, and action-
guiding species of reasoning.1 In essence, it coordinates intentions towards a state of affairs
with beliefs about possible alternative courses of action that are means to achieve that state
and with a practical judgement that recommends a prudent course of action, and it concludes
in an intention to act according to the practical judgement. So conceived, practical reasoning
is the vehicle of decision-making. It works out the requirements and steps of a decision
by forming the sequences of possible paths of actions appropriate to a situation. Here, a
decision is a composite concept specifying what practical judgement the agent has brought
about through practical reasoning and how the agent is committed to acting in compliance
with that judgement.
Most traditional work within the area of practical reasoning and decision-making has con-
centrated on solipsistic agents [25, 69]. However, with the advent of the Internet and other
forms of network computing and applications that use cooperative agents working towards
a common goal, multiple agents are increasingly becoming the norm [50]. In such cases,
we need to re-consider and extend our notions of practical reasoning and decision-making
so that they deal with the inherently social aspects of these classes of multi-agent systems.
Given this, we are speciﬁcally concerned with issues that arise in the formal speciﬁcation of
practical reasoning and decision-makingwithin a social setting, particularly within groupsof
agents that are primarily designed to exhibit speciﬁed intelligent behaviour as a collective.
Collaborative decision-making (CDM) is perhaps the paradigm example of activity in multi-
agent systems [11, 50]. It refers to a group of logically decentralized agents that cooperate to
achieve objectives that are typically beyond the capabilities of any individual agent. In short,
CDM has generally been viewed and modelled as a kind of distributed reasoning and search,
whereby a collection of agents collaboratively go through the search space of a problem in
order to ﬁnd a solution [11, 33, 38].
Recently, a number of theoretical models have been proposed for investigating decision-
making in a social setting [33, 48, 71, 82, 86]. However, none of these approaches cover the
full breadth of social and cognitive activities that are typically involved in a CDM process.
In some of these approaches, agents are seen as endowed with identiﬁable decision-making
capabilities and are grouped together to form communities which cooperate to achieve both
individual goals and the goals of the system as a whole [62, 86]. In these approaches, co-
operative behaviour stems from predeﬁned interactions between tightly coupled agents that
cannot operate outside of the speciﬁc cooperation protocols speciﬁed in advance by the sys-
tem designer. Therefore each agent has little knowledge of the system’s overall objective
or of general strategies for communication and coordination. In other approaches, the main
focus is on coordinationstrategies between multiple decision-makers[15, 32, 34, 37, 78, 79].
Consequently,the mental apparatusand inferentialmechanisms of agents are obscuredunder
the mere assumption that agents have their own decision-making expertise which frequently
has to be coordinated when the goals undertaken by individual agents are related.
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Since, according to our formal framework, intentions are primitive notions, and not all
intentions are also goals, we cannot use Cohen and Levesque’s approach [27] according to
which joint commitments are a subset of joint goals (characterized by being persistent) and
joint intentions are, in turn, a subset of joint commitments (characterized by the group acting
in a particular joint mental state). Indeed, there might well be persistent joint intentions that
are not persistent joint goals. Likewise, there might be joint intentions that cannot be charac-
terizedas persistentjoint intentions,that is, intentionsthat areas stable as joint commitments.
Furthermore, Cohen and Levesque [27] deﬁne joint commitments simply in terms of escape
conditions without any account of the nature of the relationships between group members.
Therefore, their notion fails to explain why a group of agents should be committed to acting
in a collaborative way. What is needed to circumvent this shortcoming is a normative con-
straint on inter-agent behaviour that binds multiple agents into a unitary group where each
member is committed to doing its own part towards the achievement of a given state.
Given this, our view is to follow Cohen and Levesque [27] in characterizing joint commit-
ment in terms of persistence. However, unlike Cohen and Levesque, we conceptualize a joint
commitment in terms of the persistence of a joint intention rather than of a joint goal. Most
importantly, we model the persistence of a joint intention towards a state of affairs by adding
the stronger condition that all group members must be individually committed to the group
with respect to that state. Thus, our approachallows us: (a) to distinguish between joint goals
and persistent joint intentions; (b) to distinguish between persistent and non-persistent joint
intentions; and (c) to characterize the persistence of a joint intention in terms not only of
some escape conditions but also of normative constraints among the collaborating agents.
DEFINITION 3.1
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(e) it is true (and mutual belief in
 
 
￿) that (b) will continue to hold until it is mutually
believed in
 
 
￿ either that
  will not be true at
 
￿, or that at least one of the members has
no longer the motivation to be part of the group and drops its commitment.
Note that (e) expresses the conditions under which the joint intention may be abandoned.
As opposed to Cohen and Levesque [27], our escape conditions refer to the emergence of
some new attitudes that are incompatible with the initial commitment. The motivation for
this weaker escape condition comes, for example, from cases where a group member adheres
to the group’sjoint intention, but subsequently it has to adoptanother intention that is incom-
patible with the joint one. Condition (e), therefore, provides our model with a certain degree
of ﬂexibility as it accounts for all those cases in which the content of the escape conditions
is not completely known when the agents endorse a joint commitment to achieving a state
of affairs. In fact, in most cases, circumstances may change and it is not always possible to
correctly predict the future and to specify in advance the content of the escape conditions
under which a joint commitment may be dropped.104 Formalizing Collaborative Decision Making
not represent a desired state of affairs. Finally, like in [52], in our model there may be inten-
tions that are not goals; however, in contrast to [52], we did not assume that an agent adopts
all its goals as intentions. Other researchers [69] who did not model an agent’s mental state
within a social setting assumed that every intention is also a goal.
As described in Section 3.4.4, we distinguished between two types of intention, i.e.
Intention-to and Intention-that. Many other formalizations, such as that of Cohen and
Levesque [25], also make this distinction. For example, in [25] there are intentions with,
respectively, an action expression and a proposition as their arguments. However, in [25]
intending to bring about a state of the world means being committed to doing some sequence
of actions after which that state holds. In contrast, in our model, the agent, once adopting
an Intention-that, knows whether it is capable of fulﬁlling it in isolation or not. Should it be
unable to act on its own, the agent will have to look for assistance from other agents. What
we required is only that Intentions-that do not contradict beliefs, which means that the agent
does not have intentions towards propositions the negations of which are believed. Our dis-
tinction betweenintentions is also consistent with that of Grosz and Kraus [42]. In [42], there
are four types of intentions, Intentions-to and -that, and potential Intentions-to and -that. In
their framework, potential intentions are used to represent an agent’s mental state when it is
considering whether to adopt an intention or not. In our framework, those mental attitudes
that are potential candidates for being moved up to intention-status are formalized through
the notionof goals. In contrastto [42], in ourmodelan Intention-todoes notcommitan agent
to practical reasoning. We have taken Intentions-that to play such a role, in that they induce
the agent to look for the appropriate way to achieve the intended state of the world. Like in
[42], our notion of Intention-thatplays a key role in coordinationproblems. However,in [42]
an Intention-that forms ‘the basis for meshing sub-plans, helping one’s collaborator, and co-
ordinatingstatus updates’ (p. 282);in our approach,it formsthe basis for socially connecting
a number of agents who are jointly performing social practical reasoning processes. Indeed,
we have taken Intentions-that to be the major premisses of both deductive and non-deductive
social practical inferences.
In Section 3.5 we have formalized doxastic and motivational joint mental attitudes. Our
account of mutual beliefs is similar to that of many other systems, such as that of Cohen and
Levesque[27]. Like in [27], mutualbeliefsare an inﬁnite conjunctionof beliefs aboutothers’
beliefs about others’ beliefs (and so on to any depth) about some proposition. In contrast to
[21], we did not model joint goals and joint intentions as ﬁrst-class entities. Rather, we
followed systems such as [27, 51, 71], in which joint mental attitudes clearly build upon
the underpinning individual mental attitudes of the agents involved. However, in contrast
to [27, 51, 71], we did not model joint goals/intentions as shared individual goals/intentions
plus mutual beliefs. In Section 3.5 we explained why such a characterization is too weak
to account for truly joint mental attitudes and we formalized them in terms of our proposed
additional requirements.
Our notion of social commitment builds upon Castelfranchi’s work [18]. We used this
notion to formalize the higher-order concept of joint commitment. Like in [18], joint com-
mitments reﬂect a web of social commitment relations between the agents and the group.
However, in contrast to [18], we did not model joint commitments in terms of mutual de-
pendence between the agents. Rather, we allowed for a variety of motivations (such as a
disposition to help, authority,etc.) that may moveagents into endorsinga social commitment
towards others and hence generating a joint commitmentto acting together. Furthermore,our
notion of joint commitments is different from that of Cohen and Levesque [25, 27]. In [27],106 Formalizing Collaborative Decision Making
in [88] Pre-Team expresses a mutual belief within a group that: (a) the group has the ability
to achieve a state of affairs, and (b) each member has a commitment to achieving that state.
In the second stage of our model, we formalized a step-by-step process of endorsement of a
collective mental state, where identical individual intentions are strengthened by a joint in-
tention, and this in turn is strengthened by a joint commitment. Finally, in [88] the last stage
of CDM describes the joint performance of the agreed-upon action. In Section 4, we have
explained why our model does not deal with action execution.
A number of approaches to cooperative activity have been developed which can be revis-
ited so that we can evaluate how our model stands against them. For example, Bratman [14]
outlines three main features of shared cooperative activity: mutual responsiveness; commit-
ment to joint activity; and commitment to mutual support. Our model is consistent with this
trio of aspects. First, our modelling of agents as reactive cognitive entities that act on the ba-
sis of their mental representations of other agents’ mental attitudes accounts for some degree
of responsiveness to the changes that occur within the social environment. Second, our char-
acterization of groupsin terms of higher-orderdoxastic and motivationalattitudes allowed us
to account for commitment both to joint activity and to mutual support.
One interesting area of investigation in DAI to which we can compare our model is multi-
agent planning, particularly that work that has concentrated on multiple agents’ mental atti-
tudesforcoordinatingtheiractivities[20,42,71]. Forexample,GroszandKraus[42]develop
a formal model of collaborative plans and specify the mental states of the participants in a
collaborative activity that handles complex actions. Like their approach, we provided the
minimal mental state requirements that a group of agents must meet in order to continue to
successfully perform collaborative activity. In [42] the focus is on collaborative plan deﬁ-
nition, and details are given as to how collaborative activity rests eventually on the actions
of the individual agents involved. Our focus was on the reasoning processes that individual
agents undertake when jointly committed to acting in a collaborative manner. In [42] the
formulationof full and partial SharedPlans is aimed at providing a deﬁnition of collaborative
plans in which knowledge about how to act, ability to act and commitment to joint activity
are distributed among group members. In contrast, we did not concentrate on details about
the articulation of a collaborative plan for group action. Rather, the major goal of our work
was to provide a clear conceptual framework in which a particular form of collaborative ac-
tivity — i.e. CDM — can be evaluated in terms of its motivation, dynamics, mental state
requirements, and social interaction and reasoning processes undertaken by the participants.
The idea that the agents involved in a CDM process perform a social practical reasoning
process leads to Tuomela’s deﬁnition of social practical inference [83]. Like in [83], our
schema of social practical inference has as its ﬁrst premiss an intention to achieve a state of
the world. Moreover, like in [83], our schema contains a practical judgement expressing a
belief about an appropriate means to achieve the intended state. However, there are a number
of signiﬁcant points of differencebetween our schema and Tuomela’s. First, in [83] the agent
thatperformsasocialpracticalinferencealreadyknowstheidentityofanactionthatthegroup
has decided to perform. Indeed, each agent believes that all the others will do their parts of
that action, and it is mutually believed within the group that each agent holds such a belief
[83, p. 217]. Furthermore, in [83] the agent concludes its practical inference by performing
its part of the agreed-upon action. In contrast, in our model each agent reasons about the
appropriateaction and ends up with a practical judgementwhich does not reﬂect any form of
agreement within the group. The conclusion of our social inference is the agent’s intention
that the group performs an action (that, in turn, is based on the agent’s practical judgement).114 Formalizing Collaborative Decision Making
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5. the punctuation symbols “)”, “(”, “[”, “]”, and comma “,”.
DEFINITIONA.2
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DEFINITIONA.3
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DEFINITIONA.4
Relations and functions on time points and intervals
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￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿;
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿otherwise.
DEFINITIONA.5
We deﬁne the operators of Dynamic Logic in the following way
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿:
￿
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿;
￿
!
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿;
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
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)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ true
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
$
￿
￿
%
%
%
￿
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
$
￿
￿
￿
%
%
%
￿
￿
￿
￿
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
$
￿
￿
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
$
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
"
&
&
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
"
&
&
$
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
+
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
+
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for all
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
+
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
+
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for all
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
+
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
+
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for all
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
+
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
+
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for all
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
&
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
-
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
&
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
’ iff
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ or
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
’
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿ iff
)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for some
￿
￿ differing from
￿ at most on
(.
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